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Failure on the Red River
Of all the Civil War campaigns that took place in the Trans-Mississippi
Department, historians have appropriately devoted the most attention to the
failed Union attempt to occupy western Louisiana and eastern Texas in 1864.
Gary D. Joiner's monograph Through the Howling Wilderness: The 1864 Red
River Campaign and Union Failure in the West represents the latest attempt to
explain the strange mixture of politics, economics, and military strategy that
doomed the Union effort. Joiner, director of the Red River Regional Studies
Center in Shreveport, published another work on the subject, One Damn Blunder
from Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of 1864, in 2004. Together,
these books constitute the most up to date scholarship on the topic.
Whereas Joiner's earlier work concentrated primarily on the military aspects
of the campaign in northwest Louisiana, Through the Howling Wilderness gives
the reader a much more comprehensive view of the nature of the campaign, from
grand strategy to the experiences of ordinary soldiers. The author devotes
considerable space to the context of the campaign on both sides. Joiner argues
that the real prize for the Union in 1864 was Shreveport, at that time the
Confederate capital of Louisiana and the headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi
Department, as well as a major naval, military, and industrial target. Far from
being a backwater of the war, the author shows that Shreveport was a heavily
fortified city that served as the focal point of Confederate industry, such as the
arms depot in nearby Tyler, Texas. The city also represented a threat to the
Union navy, as the Confederates had an ironclad, the CSS Missouri, and several
submarines in Shreveport that posed a threat to Union control of the Mississippi.
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Joiner assigns primary blame for the Union failure to General Nathaniel P.
Banks. A Massachusetts Republican, and possible rival to Abraham Lincoln's
reelection campaign, the highly political Banks viewed the advance on
Shreveport in political terms. He wanted Union control of the rich
cotton-growing districts along the Red River to satisfy textile mill owners in his
home state. Banks also wanted to capture Shreveport to depose the Confederate
state government and install one loyal to the Union under Lincoln's ten per cent
plan.
Banks's lack of military knowledge and political ambition did not constitute
the only reasons for the Union disaster. Within the army, Generals Ulysses S.
Grant and William T. Sherman distrusted Banks and preferred an attack on
Mobile, Alabama, rather than the Louisiana expedition. Inter-service rivalry and
competing demands for manpower led to a dangerous situation where the
expedition had three elements: Banks's troops from New Orleans, ten thousand
men from Sherman's command, and a virtually independent naval contingent
under Admiral David Dixon Porter. Joiner does a superb job of explaining how
the Confederate naval threat led Porter to use heavy ironclads unsuitable for the
Red River above the falls at Alexandria. The admiral's anxiety nearly led to the
loss of the fleet in shallow waters, but fortunately engineer Colonel Bailey
constructed a dam that enabled the fleet to escape.
Joiner argues that poor planning by Banks ultimately caused the Union
defeat at Mansfield and subsequent Battle of Pleasant Hill. As the army marched
north of Natchitoches, Banks decided to turn away from the river and forego the
support of Porter's gunboats. Even worse, the Union commander concentrated
his forces on one road in the Howling Wilderness of northwestern Louisiana
instead of advancing on different approaches. Joiner shows that Banks's
marching order, with the supply train jammed between the cavalry and advance
infantry elements, meant that supporting units could not reach the battlefield
quickly. This error and the aggressive tactics of Confederate Major General
Richard Taylor led to a humiliating defeat and the abandonment of the entire
campaign by Banks.
Joiner concentrates on the fighting in Louisiana, but he does not ignore the
other element of the Union campaign, the attempt by Major General Frederick
Steele to advance from Little Rock, Arkansas, and help Banks capture
Shreveport. The author explains the convoluted nature of the campaign in
Arkansas clearly. Steele faced even worse problems of supply and coordination
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than had Banks, ultimately leading to a strategic defeat at the hands of a
numerically inferior enemy and a retreat to Little Rock.
The author concludes by arguing that the failure of the Red River Campaign
represented a huge setback to the Union and delayed the end of the war by
squandering two infantry corps that Sherman could have put to better use as part
of his Georgia campaign. Instead of capturing Shreveport, Banks' failure had the
effect of ending any real effort by the Union in the Trans-Mississippi. Through
the Howling Wilderness is the best monograph available on a relatively unknown
campaign. Thanks to Joiner, historians and Civil War buffs alike can understand
the bizarre story of the Red River Campaign.
Charles V. Waite is assistant professor of history at The University of
Texas-Pan American.
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